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Abstract. The widespread adoption of mobile communication devices
combined with technical improvements of location technologies are fos-
tering the development of a new wave of applications that manage phys-
ical positions of individuals to offer location-based services for business,
social or informational purposes. As an effect of such innovative services,
however, privacy concerns are increasing, calling for more sophisticated
solutions for providing users with different and manageable levels of pri-
vacy. In this work, we propose a way to express users privacy preferences
on location information in a straightforward and intuitive way. Then,
based on such location privacy preferences, we discuss a new solution,
based on obfuscation techniques, which permits us to achieve, and quan-
titatively estimate through a metric, different degrees of location privacy.
1 Introduction
Information regarding physical locations of individuals is rapidly be-
coming easily available for processing by online and mobile Location-
Based Services (LBSs). Customer-oriented applications, social networks
and monitoring services can be functionally enriched with data report-
ing where people are, how they are moving or whether they are close by
specific locations. To this end, several commercial and enterprise-oriented
LBSs are already available and have gained popularity [4]. Key to those
new LBSs are modern location technologies that have reached good pre-
cision and reliability at costs that most people (e.g., the cost of mobile
devices) and companies (e.g., the cost of integrating location technologies
in existing telecommunication infrastructures) can economically sustain.
Combined with novel application opportunities, however, threats to
personal privacy are ramping up [4], as witnessed by recent security inci-
dents targeting privacy of individuals, revealed faulty data management
practices, and unauthorized trading of users personal information (in-
cluding ID thefts and unauthorized profiling). Location information is
not immune from such threats and presents new dangers such as stalking
or physical harassment.
In this scenario, a novel contribution of the paper is represented by a
comprehensive solution aimed at preserving location privacy of individ-
uals through artificial perturbations of location information collected by
sensing technology. In particular, location information of users is managed
by a trusted middleware [5, 6, 9], which enforces users privacy through
obfuscation-based techniques.
Key to this work is the concept of relevance as the adimensional met-
ric for the location accuracy. A relevance value is always associated with
locations and it quantitatively characterizes the degree of privacy artifi-
cially introduced into a location measurement. Based on relevance, it is
possible to strike a balance between the need of service providers, requir-
ing a certain level of location accuracy, and the need of users, asking to
minimize the disclosure of personal location information. Both needs can
be expressed as relevances and either quality of online services or location
privacy can be adjusted, negotiated or specified as contractual terms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents
related work. Section 3 discusses our working assumptions. Section 4 il-
lustrates our approach for defining location privacy preferences and in-
troduces the concept of relevance. Section 5 presents our obfuscation
techniques. Section 6 describes a first solution to their composition and
presents some examples of application. Section 7 gives our conclusions.
2 Related work
Location privacy issues are the subject of growing research efforts.
The main branch of current research on LBS privacy focuses on users
anonymity or partial identities [6, 7, 9]. Beresford and Stajano [6] present
mix zones, a method used to enhance privacy in LBSs managed by trusted
middlewares. The solution is based on preset physical zones where all
users are indiscernible from one another. However, this solution is suit-
able for services that track users movement rather than, as in our case,
for services requiring a user location at a specific time. Bettini et. al. [7]
propose a framework in charge of evaluating the risk of sensitive location-
based information dissemination, and a technique aimed at supporting
k-anonymity [14]. Gruteser and Grunwald [9] define k-anonymity in the
context of location obfuscation and propose a middleware architecture
and an adaptive algorithm for adjusting location information resolution
according to anonymity requirements.
Other works study the possibility of protecting users privacy through
the definition of complex rule-based policies [10, 11]. Although policies-
based solutions are suitable for privacy protection, users, often, are not
willing to directly manage complex policies and, hence, refuse participa-
tion in pervasive environments. By contrast, in this work we have imple-
mented a solution for expressing privacy preferences that is simple and
intuitive.
Finally, the line of research closest to our work consists in the adop-
tion of obfuscation techniques aimed at location privacy protection. Lo-
cation obfuscation is complementary to anonymity. In particular, rather
than anonymizing users identities, obfuscation-based solutions assume the
identification of users and introduce perturbations into collected locations
to decrease their accuracy. Duckham and Kulik [8] develop an obfusca-
tion technique for protecting location privacy by artificially inserting into
measurements some fake points with the same probability as the real user
position. The paper proposes a formal framework providing a mechanism
for balancing between user needs for high-quality information services and
for location privacy. The work of Bellavista et al. [5] is based on points
of interest with symbolic location granularity (e.g., city, country). This
forces the privacy level to some predefined choices only, resulting in an
excessively rigid solution.
Current obfuscation-based solutions have some shortcomings that our
proposal tries to address. First, they do not provide a quantitative esti-
mation of the actual privacy level, which makes them highly dependent
on the application contexts and difficult to integrate into a full fledged
location-based application scenario [1, 3]. Next, just a single obfuscation
technique is usually implemented. By contrast, our work introduces the
concept of relevance as an adimensional metric for location accuracy, de-
fines more obfuscation techniques and demonstrate the benefits of their
composition.
3 Working assumptions
Our work is based on two working assumptions that simplify our analy-
sis with no loss of generality. Our first working assumption concerns the
shape of a location measurement: the area returned by a location measure-
ment is planar and circular. User location information, in fact, is affected
by an intrinsic measurement error introduced by sensing technologies,
resulting in spatial areas rather than geographical points. This assump-
tion represents a particular case of the general requirement of considering
convex areas and a good approximation for actual shapes resulting from
many location technologies (e.g., cellular phones location). According to
this assumption, a location measurement is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Location measurement) A location measurement of a
user u is a circular area Area(r, xc, yc), centered on the geographical coor-
dinates (xc, yc) and with radius r, which includes the real user’s position
(xu, yu) with probability P ((xu, yu) ∈ Area(r, xc, yc)) = 1.
Definition 1 comes from observing that sensing technologies based on
cellular phones usually guarantee that the real user’s position falls within
the returned area.
To discuss the effects of obfuscation techniques, we introduce our sec-
ond assumption. Consider a random location within a location measure-
ment Area(r, xc, yc), where a “random location” is a neighborhood of
random point (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ Area(r, xc, yc). Our second assumption is that the
probability that the real user’s position (xu, yu) belongs to a neighborhood
of a random point (xˆ, yˆ) is uniformly distributed over the whole location
measurement. Accordingly, the joint probability density function (pdf) of
the real user’s position can be defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Uniform joint pdf) Given a location measurement
Area(r, xc, yc), the joint probability density function (joint pdf) fr(x, y)
of real user’s position (xu, yu) to be in the neighborhood of point (x, y) is:
fr(x, y) =
(
1
pir2
if x, y ∈ Area(r, xc, yc)
0 otherwise.
Same assumption can be found in other works on this topic [12]. In
this work, assuming a uniform distribution simplifies the discussion with
no loss of generality. Considering Gaussian-like distributions, the conse-
quence on our work is that obfuscating simply by scaling the radius of
a location measurement is ineffective, while stronger obfuscation effects
can be still achieved by combining different techniques.
4 Privacy preferences and location relevance
The ultimate goal of this work is to design a solution able to manage loca-
tion privacy as a functional term, required or adjusted by users according
to their preferences and application context, and negotiated as a service
attribute by users and LBSs. To this end, location privacy should be mea-
sured and quantified with regard to the accuracy of a user position, that
is, the more accurate the position, the less privacy. Furthermore, location
privacy should be measured regardless of specific application contexts and
should be expressed quantitatively as a service parameter without sticking
to some coarse-grained preset meta-locations such as “city” or “depart-
ment”, which represents simplified instances of privacy preferences that
should be supported by a most general and flexible solution.
Before defining obfuscation techniques and their combination, we dis-
cuss some key aspects: accuracy estimations of available location tech-
nologies, the specification of users privacy preferences, and the concept
of relevance.
4.1 Location accuracy and measurement quality
The accuracy of a location measurement necessarily depends on the spe-
cific sensing technology and on the environmental conditions. Several
works describe available sensing technologies discussing their accuracy.
In [15], the authors provide a survey of standard positioning solutions
for cellular networks such as, E-OTD for GSM, OTDOA for Wideband
CDMA (WCDMA), and Cell-ID. Specifically, E-OTD location method is
based on the existing observed time difference (OTD) feature of GSM sys-
tems. The accuracy of the E-OTD estimation, in recent studies, has been
found to range from 50m to 125m. Observed Time Difference Of Arrival
(OTDOA), instead, is designed to operate over wideband-code division
multiple access (WCDMA) networks. The positioning process achieves a
location accuracy of 50m at most. Finally, Cell-ID is a simple position-
ing method based on cell sector information, where cell size varies from
1-3km in urban areas to 3-20km in suburban/rural areas.
To evaluate the quality of a given location measurement, its accuracy
must be compared with the nominal accuracy that the adopted sensing
technology can reach. To this end, we call rmeas the radius of a mea-
sured area and ropt the radius of the area that would be produced if
the best accuracy is reached. In other words, rmeas represents the actual
measurement error, while ropt is the minimum error. Therefore, the ratio
r2opt/r
2
meas is a good estimation of the quality of each location measure-
ment. For instance, assume that a user position is located with accuracy
rmeas=62.5m using E-OTD method, accuracy rmeas=50m using OTDOA,
and accuracy rmeas=1km using Cell-ID. Optimal accuracy is ropt=50m.
Then, according to r2opt/r
2
meas, the area provided by OTDOA has a mea-
surement quality of 1, whereas the others have a quality proportionally
reduced to 0.8 for E-OTD, and 0.05 for Cell-ID.
4.2 User privacy preferences
Systems that want to let users express their privacy preferences must
strike a balance between the two traditionally conflicting requirements of
usability and expressiveness. Complex policy specifications, fine-grained
configurations and explicit technological details discourage users from
fully exploiting the provided functionalities. Our goal is then to allow
users to express privacy preferences in an intuitive and straightforward
way. Our solution is based on users privacy preferences specified as a
minimum distance [8, 13]. According to this setting, for example, a user
can define “100 meters” as her privacy preference, which means that she
demands to be located with an accuracy not better than 100 meters.
Considering circular areas, the privacy requirement is implemented by
enlarging the radius of the original measurement to 100 meters, at least.
However, privacy preferences expressed as a minimum distance have the
drawback of being meaningful if associated with a technique that enlarge
the original measurement only. Another issue that is often neglected by
traditional location obfuscation solutions is the possibility to compose
different obfuscation techniques to increase their robustness with respect
to possible de-obfuscation attempts performed by adversaries.
Therefore, a major challenge is to design a system able to integrate
several obfuscation techniques still relying on the definition of privacy
preference in its simplest form, e.g., it would be unrealistic to explicitly
ask user to specify a particular composition of techniques. Our solution
transforms a simple preference like a minimum distance into a more gen-
eral functional term with the constraint that the final obfuscated area
produced by different obfuscation techniques must be equivalent, in terms
of location privacy, to the area that would be derived by just enlarging
the radius of the original measurement to the specified minimum distance.
This way, we let users specify their preferences in the most intuitive way,
whereas we can adopt obfuscation techniques different and more robust
than the simple radius enlargement. The availability of a single obfus-
cation technique by enlarging the radius, in fact, gives to an adversary
the possibility of guessing a better user position by simply reducing the
observed area. Our solution, instead, introduces additional obfuscation
techniques, and therefore improves user privacy.
To this end, we first introduce the attribute λ that represents a rela-
tive privacy preference (or, in other terms, a relative degradation of the
location accuracy). λ must be derived from the minimum distance spec-
ified by a user, which we call rmin, and from the radius of the original
measurement, the previously introduced rmeas. Having assumed circular
areas, the relative accuracy degradation obtained by setting rmin is:
λ =
max(rmeas, rmin)
2 − r2meas
r2meas
=
max(rmeas, rmin)
2
r2meas
− 1 (1)
The term max(rmeas, rmin) represents the special case of a minimum
distance rmin smaller than the original rmeas. This is possible because the
user is not aware of the actual accuracy of sensing technologies and the
original measure could already satisfy the privacy preference by itself. Ac-
cordingly, the term λ is zero when the measurement accuracy (i.e., rmeas)
already satisfies the user requirement (i.e., rmin) and no transformation
to the original measurement is needed to satisfy privacy preferences. Oth-
erwise, when this is not the case (i.e., rmin > rmeas), λ corresponds to
various degrees of accuracy degradation, e.g., λ = 0.2 means 20% of
degradation, λ = 1 means 100% of degradation and any value λ > 1
corresponds to a degradation greater than 100%.
Up to this point, the first benefit achieved by deriving λ from rmin
and rmeas is that we can process a privacy preference as a relative degra-
dation rather than the strictly dimensional and tightly coupled with the
enlargement of the measured area rmin.
The next step is to introduce other obfuscation techniques and select
them, individually or combined, to produce an obfuscated area that de-
grades the original accuracy as imposed by λ. This way, we can employ an
enriched set of obfuscation techniques still relying on the simple definition
of rmin as the user privacy preference. The drawback, which we consider
acceptable, is that we are changing the meaning of the user preference
rmin, which is not necessarily the radius of the obfuscated area. Instead,
it represents a logical constraints that can be informally expressed as: the
location area produced by one or more a priori undetermined obfuscation
techniques must be equivalent, in term of privacy, to the one produced by
enlarging the radius of the original measurement up to rmin.
4.3 Relevance
Key to our work is the notion of relevance, defined as an adimensional,
technology-independent metric for the accuracy of an obfuscated area.
The relevance metric is a value R ∈ (0, 1] that tends to 0 when location
information must be considered unreliable for application providers; it is
equal to 1 when location information has best accuracy; and a relevance
value in (0,1) corresponds to some degrees of accuracy. Accordingly, the
location privacy provided by an obfuscated location is evaluated by (1-
R). The reason for choosing to represent the accuracy of a location as a
primitive concept rather than the privacy is functional. We assume that
LBSs have to manage locations that, on the one side, could be perturbed
for privacy reasons, while on the other side could be required to have an
accuracy not below a threshold to preserve a certain quality of service. In
our solution, all locations have an associated relevance attribute, from an
initial location affected by a measurement error of sensing technologies to
all possible subsequent manipulations to provide privacy. This way, rele-
vance is the general functional term that qualifies a location with respect
to either accuracy or privacy requirements. Two important relevance val-
ues characterize our privacy management solution:
– Initial relevance (RInit). The metric for the accuracy of a user location
measurement as returned by a sensing technology. This is the initial
value of the relevance that only depends on the intrinsic measurement
error.
– Final relevance (RFinal). The metric for the accuracy of the final
obfuscated area produced by satisfying a relative privacy preference λ.
It is derived, starting by the initial relevance, through the application
of one or more obfuscation techniques.
A third relevance value is used when the combination of techniques
will be discussed. It represents the intermediate relevance, denotedRInter,
derived by applying the first of two obfuscation techniques.
With regard to RInit, it evaluates the accuracy of the actual area
returned by a specific location measurement. A good metric is the ratio of
the area that would have been returned if the best accuracy was achieved
(i.e., the one with radius ropt) and the actual measured area (i.e., the one
with radius rmeas). RFinal instead, is derived from RInit by considering
the relative privacy preference λ.
Definition 3 (RInit and RFinal) Given a location measurement area of
radius rmeas measured by a sensing technology, a radius ropt representing
the best accuracy of sensing technologies and a relative privacy preference
λ, initial relevance RInit and final relevance RFinal are calculated as:
RInit = r
2
opt
r2meas
(2)
RFinal = RInit
λ+ 1
(3)
These definitions represent, respectively, our general forms of RInit
and RFinal. By definition of λ (see (1)), the term 1λ+1 represents the
degradation of the initial RInit that satisfies the user privacy preference.
The corresponding obfuscated area will be qualified by relevance RFinal.
In equation (3), substituting the term RInit with equation (2) and term
λ with equation (1), it results that RFinal = r
2
opt
r2min
, assuming rmin > rmeas
in (1). This represents the value of RFinal that corresponds to degrading
the accuracy by λ, as for user’s privacy preference.
5 Obfuscation techniques
We now present three basic obfuscation techniques and their operators.
Since there could be one or two obfuscation steps in our solution, we
generically call R the relevance associated with the area to be obfuscated
and R′ the relevance of the obfuscated area. If only one obfuscation step
is performed, then R =RInit and R′ =RFinal. For two obfuscation steps,
we have R =RInit and R′ =RInter for the first one, and R =RInter and
R′ =RFinal for the second one.
Furthermore, we employ obfuscation operators as a logical representa-
tion of the physical transformations realized by different obfuscation tech-
niques: i) the Enlarge operator (E) degrades the accuracy of an initial
location area by enlarging its radius; ii) the Shift operator (S) degrades
the accuracy of an initial location area by shifting its center; and iii) the
Reduce operator (R) degrades the accuracy of an initial location area by
reducing its radius.
5.1 Obfuscation by enlarging the radius
Obfuscating a location measurement area by increasing its radius (see
Fig. 1(a)) is the technique that most current solutions adopt. Obfuscation
is a probabilistic effect provided by the decreasing of the joint probability
density function (pdf), which we can express as ∀r, r′ ∈ IR+, r < r′ :
fr(x, y) > fr′(x, y). The relevance R′ can be derived from R by using the
ratio of the associated pdf as the scalar factor:
R′ = fr′ (x, y)
fr(x, y)
· R = r
2
r′2
· R, with r < r′ (4)
Therefore, given two relevances, R and R′, and the radius r of the
initial area, an obfuscated area calculated with this technique has a final
radius: r′ = r
√
R
R′ .
Fig. 1. Obfuscation by enlarging the radius (a), shifting the center (b), and reducing
the radius (c)
Finally, radius r′ can be expressed as a function of λ: r′ = r
√
λ+ 1.
This result is straightforward from equations (3) and (4) and reflects the
definition of λ, which depends from rmin and assumes an obfuscation by
enlarging the radius.
For instance, let the user privacy preference be rmin=1 km. Suppose
that the location measurement of a user u has radius rmeas=0.5 km,
and the optimal measurement accuracy is ropt=0.4 km. Given this infor-
mation, relevance RInit associated with the location measurement, and
relative privacy preference λ are calculated as RInit= r
2
opt
r2meas
=0.64, and
λ = max(rmeas,rmin)
2
r2meas
− 1=3, respectively. Having calculated the relative
privacy preference λ, RFinal is derived as RFinal=(λ + 1)−1RInit=0.16.
Now, the obfuscation by enlarging the radius is applied and the obfus-
cated area is derived by calculating r′ = rmeas
√
λ+ 1=1 km. Note that,
since a single obfuscation by enlarging the radius is used, r′ = rmin. How-
ever, this example shows the computations that have to be applied when
a double obfuscation is used (see Section 6).
5.2 Obfuscation by shifting the center
Shifting the center of a location measurement is another viable obfusca-
tion technique (see Fig. 1(b)). An obfuscated area is derived from the
original area by calculating the distance d between the two centers [2].
To measure the obfuscation effect and define the relation between rele-
vances, two probabilities must be composed: i) the probability that the
real user’s position belongs to the intersection AreaInit∩Final, and ii) the
probability that a random point selected from the whole obfuscated area
belongs to the intersection. Then, the relation between relevances R and
R′ is represented by:
R′ = P ((xu, yu) ∈ AreaInit∩Final) · P ((x, y) ∈ AreaInit∩Final) =
AreaInit∩Final
Area(r, xc, yc)
· AreaInit∩Final
Area(r, xc +∆x, yc +∆y)
=
Area2Init∩Final
Area(r, xc, yc)2
· R (5)
Recalling equations (3) and (5), it follows that (λ+1)−1 = Area
2
Init∩Final
Area(r,xc,yc)2
.
Then, given λ, and pir2 as the value of both areas, the overlapping can
be expressed as: AreaInit∩Final = pir2/
√
λ+ 1.
Distance d between the centers is the unknown variable to be derived
to obtain the obfuscated area. It can be calculated by expanding the term
AreaInit∩Final as a function of d and by solving the following system of
equations, whose variables are d, σ and γ. Here, σ and γ are the central
angles of circular sectors identified by the two radii connecting the centers
of the areas with the intersection points of original and obfuscated areas.1
8><>:
h
σ
2
r2 − r2
2
sinσ
i
+
h
γ
2
R2 − R2
2
sin γ
i
=
√
δpir ·R
d = r cos σ
2
+R cos γ
2
r sin σ
2
= R sin γ
2
(6)
Solutions of this system can be obtained numerically. By our defini-
tions, obfuscated areas calculated by shifting the center satisfy a relative
privacy preference λ and thus provides same privacy of an obfuscated area
that would have been calculated with an enlarged radius rmin.
For instance, let the user specifies her privacy preference through
rmin=1.42 km. Suppose that the location measurement of a user u has ra-
dius rmeas=1 km, and the optimal measurement accuracy is ropt=0.8 km.
Relevance RInit and λ are calculated as RInit=0.64, and λ=1, respec-
tively. Then, RFinal=0.32 is derived and the obfuscation by shifting the
center applied. At this point, distance d=0.464 km is calculated by solv-
ing the system of equation (6). Finally, an angle θ is randomly selected
and the obfuscated area is generated.
5.3 Obfuscation by reducing the radius
The third obfuscation technique consists in reducing the radius r of one
location from r to r′, as showed in Fig. 1(c). The obfuscation effect is
1 The system of equation (6) is presented in the most general form, where there are
two areas with different radii (i.e., r and R).
produced by a correspondent reduction of the probability to find the real
user location within the returned area, whereas the joint pdf is fixed.
If we call (xu, yu) the unknown real user position coordinates, by
assumption the probability that the real user position falls in the area
of radius r is P ((xu, yu) ∈ Area(r, x, y)) = 1. When we obfuscate
by reducing the radius, an area of radius r′ ≤ r is returned, where
P ((xu, yu) ∈ Area(r′, x, y)) ≤ P ((xu, yu) ∈ Area(r, x, y)), since a circular
ring having pdf greater than zero has been excluded.
With regard to relevances R and R′, their relation can be defined as:
R′ = P ((xu, yu) ∈ Area(r
′, x, y))
P ((xu, yu) ∈ Area(r, x, y)) · R =
r′2
r2
· R, with r′ < r (7)
From (3) and (7), it follows that (λ+1)−1 = r
′2
r2
. Then, given λ and r,
the area returned when obfuscation by reducing the radius is applied has
radius: r′ = r√
λ+1
. Again, similarly to the previous technique, obfuscated
areas calculated in this way by reducing the radius satisfy, according to
our semantics, a relative privacy preference λ and consequently, also the
corresponding user privacy preference rmin.
For instance, let the user privacy preference be rmin=1 km. Suppose
that the location measurement of a user u has radius rmeas=0.5 km,
and the optimal measurement accuracy is ropt=0.4 km. Relevance RInit
and λ are calculated as RInit=0.64, and λ=3. RFinal is derived as
RFinal=(λ + 1)−1RInit=0.16. Now, the obfuscation by reducing the ra-
dius is applied and the obfuscated area, respecting user privacy preference
rmin, is derived by calculating r′ = rmeas√λ+1=0.25 km.
6 Double obfuscation
Given the obfuscation techniques just introduced, users privacy prefer-
ences can be satisfied either by using one technique among the three or
by composing two techniques. In the last case, an obfuscated area pro-
duced by one obfuscation technique (operator h) is further obfuscated by
the application of a second technique (operator g). Formally, let be A
the set of location areas, h : A → A and g : A → A be two obfuscation
operators, where the areas produced by applying the operator h are the
inputs of the second operator g, which finally produces the obfuscated
areas. Recalling that the ultimate goal of an obfuscation process is to
reduce the location accuracy estimated by an initial relevance RInit to
a final relevance RFinal, in case of double obfuscation, the intermediate
Fig. 2. Example of E − S obfuscation
term RInter must be introduce to represent the relevance achieved by the
first obfuscation step.
As a special example of obfuscation composition, let us consider an
enlargement of the radius followed by a shift of the center (see Fig. 2). For
the first obfuscation, the radius of area B is calculated by applying oper-
ator Enlarge and equation R′ = r2
r′2 · R, with R =RInit and R′ =RInter.
For the second step, operator Shift is used with an important constraint:
the domain of the Shift operator must be restricted to those areas that
have an intersection with the original measured area (i.e., in our example
the intersection between the final obfuscated area C and area A should
not be empty). As a consequence, to calculate the final obfuscated area
C, we need to determinate distance d, which depends on the overlap be-
tween area A and C. The reason is that to respect privacy preference
λ, the second operator of a composition must be always referred to the
original measured area A. Accordingly, equation R′ = (A∩C)2A·C · R, has
R′ =RFinal and R =RInit, rather than R =RInter as we would have
expected in general.
Finally, we observe that, whereas in theory it is possible to compose
operators E, R, and S in an indeterminate number of steps, there is never
any convenience to combine more than two techniques. This follows by
a geometric property of circles assuring that, given two circles A1 and
A2, A2 can be generated starting from A1 through two geometric oper-
ations at most: one center-shifting, and one between radius enlargement
or reduction. Finally, we observe that, as for most composable functions,
the commutative property does not hold for the composition of opera-
Fig. 3. Example of S − E and S −R obfuscation on a large scale
tors Enlarge or Reduce with Shift. Therefore, the available obfuscation
choices are: i) traditional single obfuscations E, R, and S; ii) double
obfuscations E − S, S − E, R− S, and S −R.
6.1 Double obfuscation examples
We describe two examples of possible application of double obfuscation.
For sake of clarity, we suppose an user located in Manhattan, around
the Empire State Building. A location measurement is assumed to have
radius rmeas=1km (see the area with filled line in Fig. 3).2 The user has
specified her privacy preference as rmin=2km. Given these information,
λ, RInit, and RFinal are calculated before applying obfuscations.
For the first example, an S − E obfuscation has been applied. The
obfuscation process starts by setting θ = pi/4 and RInter=0.4.
Distance d=0.464km is calculated by solving the system of equations
(6), and location measurement area is shifted accordingly generating an
2 In these examples, ropt=0.895km. We are aware that this assumption is far from
reality, but it was assumed for simplicity.
obfuscated area of relevance RInter. Finally, the Enlarge operator is ap-
plied to the area with relevance RInter, and final radius r′=2 km is com-
puted to achieve relevance RFinal. This way, when the user location is
released to a LBS she results positioned in a bigger area that includes
nearly all Central Manhattan (see the area with dotted line in Fig. 3).
For the second example, suppose a R−S obfuscation. Again, for sim-
plicity we set RInter=0.4 and θ = 5pi/3. Radius r′=0.707 km is computed
from (7) and the first obfuscated area is produced. Then, the system of
equations (6) is solved numerically resulting in d =0.679 km, and the
center is shifted. This way, when the user location is released to a LBS,
the user seems located just around Madison Square (see the area with
dashed line showed in Fig. 3).
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented privacy-enhanced techniques that protect user privacy
based on spatial obfuscation. Our proposal aims at achieving a solution
that both considers the accuracy of location measurements, which is an
important feature of location information, and the need of privacy of
users. In addition to several obfuscation techniques for privacy preserva-
tion, we also present and define a formal and intuitive way to express users
privacy preferences, and a formal metric for location accuracy. Issues to be
investigated include the analysis of our solution assuming Gaussian-like
distributions, the evaluation of obfuscation techniques robustness against
de-obfuscation attacks, and the possibility to manage different privacy
preferences expressed by users.
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